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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Neuromorphic computing endeavors to imitate the way biological brains process 
information and problem-solve. Uses for neuromorphic computing span disciplines and include 
applications in image processing, audio processing, optimization, and more. Neural networks can 
be used for neuromorphic computing, and these neural networks can be implemented in software 
or emulated in hardware.  
This work explores the effect of proton-induced single-event upsets on a neuromorphic 
computing architecture engaged in image recognition. First, background on neuromorphic 
computing, neural networks, and radiation effects is given. Next, the hardware and its operation 
are introduced followed by the setup used for the experiments. The remaining portion of the work 
covers the experimental results, simulation results, and the conclusions drawn from the 
experiments that are supported by simulation. 
In the experiments, the overall classification accuracy is calculated after radiation and is 
compared to the accuracy before radiation. The changes in output classification is also explored 
along with the effects of tolerable and critical errors produced by single event effects. In addition, 
the effect of radiation on the classification of individual digits is analyzed as well. 
Two main results are found. One, the overall classification accuracy is unchanged although 
a high number of hidden, tolerable errors occurred. Additionally, single-event upsets are found to 
alter the relative occurrence of false positives and false negatives in the classification of individual 
digits. This occurred despite the overall classification accuracy remaining unaffected.   
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CHAPTER II 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
Neuromorphic Computing 
 Neuromorphic computing is brain-inspired, non-von Neumann computing. The goal of 
neuromorphic computing is to emulate the way the brain approaches complex problems, such as 
pattern recognition. There are a variety of applications for neuromorphic computing including 
signal processing, high performance computing, text and audio processing, learning and 
optimization among others [1]. Interest in specialized hardware implementations to accelerate 
these computations has increased recently. Several companies including IBM, Intel, Qualcomm, 
and Nvidia have produced specialized hardware solutions implementing neuromorphic computing 
architectures in digital CMOS. These early generation products will ideally evolve into 
highly-integrated, three-dimensional, non-volatile technologies that provide low power 
processing, similar to biological brains. 
In a similar manner to software neural networks, neuromorphic architectures are densely 
interconnected with large fan out to other neurons. Consequently, the architecture possesses 
increased redundancy compared to traditional computing architectures and can be fault tolerant if 
specifically designed that way, but comes at a computational cost [2-5]. The way neuromorphic 
computers “learn” is through the use of self-tuning weights. Since the memory and computing 
components of the chip are not physically separated as is the case in traditional architectures, the 
architecture is non-von Neumann. As a result, neuromorphic architectures have increased 
redundancy and a reduction in the memory bandwidth bottleneck compared to traditional 
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computing architectures [2]. While research is limited on how single events affect the relatively 
new architectures, studies have previously been conducted on realizations in COTs (Commercial 
off the Shelf), FPGAs (Field Programmable Gate Arrays), GPUs (Graphic Processing Units), and 
software frameworks [3, 5-7]. Several works in the literature analyze errors in neural networks 
through fault injection simulations [3-4, 6-9], radiation tests [3, 6-8], and pulsed-laser tests [10]. 
This work analyzes the effects of radiation on a neuromorphic computing architecture. Fault 
injection simulations were conducted in [8] based on the same architecture as this work. 
This work uses image classification accuracy to gauge the effects of radiation in a 
neuromorphic computing architecture. With proton irradiation of a neuromorphic chip, we 
observed nearly unaffected overall classification accuracy, but offsetting trends in false positives 
and negatives in the recognition of individual image classes. This metric of image classification 
accuracy provides further insight into the radiation response. 
 
Structure of Neural Networks 
Neuromorphic computing architectures can be modeled using neural networks. There are 
several different types of neural networks, including artificial, convolutional, and deep neural 
networks to name a few. The neural network used for the experiments with TrueNorth is a 14-layer 
convolutional neural network. 
Artificial Neuron 
Artificial neurons are the basic building blocks used in the construction of the 
abovementioned neural networks [11]. These artificial neurons are a mathematical way to model 
biological neurons for use in neuromorphic architectures. Each input xi to the neuron (a number) 
is weighted by its corresponding weight wi, and the sum of all these weighted inputs is computed. 
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This weighted sum is then applied to an activation function φ which then results in the output y. 
The output y from the artificial neuron can then be used as an input to one or more neurons in the 
next layer. Equation 1 shows the formula governing the artificial neuron, while Fig. 1 is a 
representation of an artificial neuron. Artificial neurons can be implemented in software, digital 
circuits, or analog circuits. 
 
𝑦 = 𝜙∑𝑤𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
 
(1) 
 
Activation Functions 
The weighted sum of the inputs can take on a range of values. The purpose of the activation 
function is to map these weighted sums to one of the possible outputs. In the case of the activation 
function being a step function, values above a certain point produce a high output, while values 
below this point result in the output y being low. Thus, even though the weighted sum can take on 
a variety of values, there are only two possible outputs for a step activation function. Other 
activation functions exist and have various applications and complexity. Some additional 
activation functions include sigmoid and hyperbolic tangent functions, which have bounded 
Fig.  1. Representation of an artificial neuron. 
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outputs; linear functions, whose outputs are unbounded; and functions that are not one-to-one, 
where different inputs can result in the same outputs. 
Perceptron 
 One of the most basic neural networks composed of artificial neurons is the 
perceptron [11]. A perceptron is composed of a single layer of artificial neurons, and the most 
basic type of perceptron uses the step function as its activation function. As a result of using the 
step function, there are only two possible outputs: 1 or 0. The bias b is used in determining the 
output state of the perceptron. This bias is independent of the input value and is simply an offset 
from the origin. The perceptron output is 1 (high) when the neuron’s weighted sum is greater than 
the bias, and the output is 0 (low) if the weighted sum is less than the bias. This single perceptron 
can be used for binary classification. For example, when given a picture of an animal, it could 
classify it as either “a dog” or “not a dog.” Since the output is binary, it is unable to further refine 
its original “not a dog” classification to “a cat.” More complex neural networks that use additional 
layers of neurons are necessary to achieve non-binary outputs. 
 
Artificial Neural Networks 
 Artificial neural networks are created by connecting several perceptrons together. These 
networks have more processing power, flexibility, and applicability than lone perceptrons. 
Artificial neural networks are claimed to be intrinsically fault tolerant; however, most artificial 
neural networks cannot be considered fault tolerant without a proper design. Passive fault tolerance 
can be achieved through redundancy or by modifying learning [4-5]. Including faults during 
training promotes better generalization than other limited solutions, but it comes at both a higher 
computational cost and longer time for training [4-5]. Active fault tolerance such as resetting the 
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neural network to a faultless state after a fault occurs and propagates is the most widely used design 
of fault tolerant neural networks in hardware [4-5]. 
Feedforward Neural Network 
 A feedforward neural network is an artificial neural network where the perceptrons are 
linked together in multiple layers and does not consist of any cycles. This more complex neural 
network is composed of many neurons and can solve a wider variety of classification problems. 
Each layer can have any number of neurons in it, and the number of neurons in one layer has no 
bearing on the number of neurons allowed in subsequent layers. The first layer is called the “input 
layer” and receives the inputs to the neural network. The final layer is called the “output layer” 
since this layer produces the final output of the neural network. All layers (if any) between the 
input and output layers are called “hidden layers” because their inputs and outputs are not directly 
observable outside the neural network [12]. The number of hidden layers can vary depending on 
the application and the complexity needed in the neural network. If every neuron in one layer is 
connected to every neuron in the next layer, the layers are considered to be “fully connected.” 
Fig. 2 is a representation of a fully connected feedforward neural network that contains only one 
hidden layer. 
Convolutional Neural Network 
 A convolutional neural network (CNN) is a neural network composed of perceptrons where 
convolution is performed instead of matrix multiplication in at least one layer. A typical 
configuration will have one or more convolution layers at the beginning with subsequent layers 
being fully connected, matrix multiplication layers as in a standard multilayer neural network. The 
convolution aspect of a CNN is able to take advantage of the two-dimensional nature of some 
inputs, such as audio files and images. CNNs have several advantages over fully connected neural 
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networks including easier training and fewer parameters per hidden nodes [13]. The neural 
network trained for use in this work utilizes a 14-layer CNN and classifies handwritten digits from 
the MNIST database. The information in the 784-pixel input image is given to the input layers, 
processed through the 12 hidden layers, and the final output is given in the form of 10 output 
neurons which contain information about the likelihood of the image being digits 0 through 9. 
 
Radiation Effects 
 Radiation can be found in several environments, one of which is space. Protons, alpha 
particles, and heavy ions can produce SEEs, and these particles can be found in Earth’s radiation 
belts, galactic cosmic rays, and solar heavy ions. Galactic cosmic rays are predominantly 
composed of proton and alpha particles, with less than 1% of the total particles being heavy ions. 
Solar heavy ions are produced by coronal mass ejections or solar flares [14]. 
A single event effect (SEE) may occur when a single ionizing particle strikes a 
semiconductor device. As this particle makes its way through the device, it leads to the creation of 
electron-hole pairs, depositing charge along its path [15]. Possible ionizing particles that can lead 
to an SEE include heavy ions, alpha particles, neutrons, and energetic protons. 
Fig.  2. Fully connected feedforward neural network with a single hidden layer and various weights between the 
neurons. 
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A single event upset (SEU) occurs when an SEE changes the state of the device. SEUs are 
problematic since bit flips cause corruption of the stored information. These SEUs can propagate 
through a circuit or system resulting in errors in the output [16]. In occurrence with Moore’s law, 
as transistor density increases, distance between transistors decreases [17]. As a result, an ionizing 
particle can strike more than one transistor resulting in multiple SEUs, particularly in small 
technology nodes [18]. 
 
Fault Tolerance of Neural Networks 
 In the context of computing systems, fault tolerance is defined by systems which still 
produce accurate results or outputs despite the failure of some components within the system. Fault 
tolerance can be subdivided into two categories: active and passive fault tolerance. Passive fault 
tolerance is achieved by utilizing the system structure to reduce faults, of which some examples 
are fault masking and redundancy. On the other hand, active fault tolerance is obtained by doing 
something within the system while it is running to find and manage errors as they occur. Examples 
include retraining and error detection and correction (EDC) [19]. 
Typically, fault tolerance in these computing systems is obtained by error correction (active 
fault tolerance) and/or redundancy (passive fault tolerance) within [20]. However, merely 
duplicating all the components in the computing system or adding EDC throughout the whole 
system is not the most efficient means of producing a design that is fault tolerant. While doing so 
to every component would result in a fault tolerant system, there is a high computational cost by 
the addition of all these elements. Therefore a balance is necessary between adding enough 
redundancy or EDC of important components and subsystems for high fault tolerance while still 
keeping a reasonable computational cost [20]. 
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Digital Neural Circuits 
 Reference [11] examines the fault tolerance of artificial neural networks implemented on 
digital circuits using both fault injection simulation and SEU experiments. The fault injection 
simulations were conducted by flipping individual bits in the memory to mimic upsets caused by 
radiation due to single event effects. After modifying the memory, the artificial neural network 
was evaluated. These simulations showed that the neural networks tolerated a large percentage of 
the memory being upset. Between 86% and 99% of faults injected into the memory had no effect 
on the output. In addition, actual radiation experiments were performed. As in simulation, radiation 
had only a small effect on the output. Through the radiation experiments, it was also found that 
increasing the number of hidden layers in the artificial neural network increased the effect radiation 
had on the network. Both the simulation and experimental data showed that artificial neural 
networks gradually get worse with radiation instead of abrupt failures due to radiation. 
Neural Networks Implemented on FPGAs and GPUs 
Fault injection simulations and radiation tests have been conducted on FPGAs and GPUs 
among others. In simulations on an FPGA in [3], it was shown that faults in the neural network 
did not necessarily result in an error in the output. As such, faults that do not affect the output are 
called tolerable errors, hidden errors, or silent data corruption, while faults impacting the output 
are called critical errors. Additionally using fault injection in an FPGA, [7] showed that faults 
injected close to the input layers of the neural network had a more significant effect on the output 
than upsets in later layers. It was found in [6] that a single fault in a GPU tends to spread through 
multiple threads, and therefore it is important to be able to detect and correct errors in critical 
applications. Finally, [4] shows that deep neural network resistance to errors is dependent on a 
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number of factors including on the data itself in addition to the types of layers in the neural network 
design. 
SRAM-Based Artificial Neural Networks 
In [10], an SRAM-based artificial neural network tasked with image recognition was hit 
with a pulsed laser to generate SEUs. The beam was focused onto cells in the SRAM that contained 
weights and thresholds for the artificial neural network. In most cases, the image recognition rate 
did not change, indicating that the errors did not affect the output. In the cases that the recognition 
rate did change, it was improved in some cases and diminished in others. The experiments with 
the pulsed laser affected artificial neural network performance in a manner that error injection 
through software simulation could not [10]. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
TRUENORTH 
 
Hardware 
The particular hardware studied in this work was IBM’s TrueNorth Neurosynaptic System 
fabricated in Samsung’s 28nm low power (LP) process. It is programmable and executes trained 
“corelets,” which are TrueNorth programs uploaded to the board via scripts from a computer. The 
chip implements a spontaneously-spiking neural network (SNN), meaning that the output spikes 
are not governed by a global clock. The neurons in the SNN integrate the input spikes and add to 
the membrane potential. This potential takes into account the weights of the neurons, and the 
weight decreases as a function of time, causing newer events to have more effect than older ones. 
When the membrane potential surpasses the pre-determined threshold, the output neuron fires a 
spike into the network. In addition, the SNN in the TrueNorth chip also includes leakage from the 
potential to emulate “forgetting” [21]. Therefore, older events have less of an effect on the neural 
potential than more recent events [22].  
The chip was designed to be power efficient. The power efficiency is due mainly to local, 
distributed memory that limits the distance on the chip that spikes must travel. TrueNorth also uses 
an event-driven architecture, the SNN, therefore components only have to be “on” and consuming 
power when prompted by an event. The lack of a global clock network also contributes to the 
power efficiency of the chip [21]. 
TrueNorth is scalable and fault tolerant [21]. Up to sixteen TrueNorth chips can be 
physically connected, and the software is already designed to allow communication among the 
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various chips. In addition, the high connectivity between neurons, cores, and chips creates 
redundancy. A result of the interconnectedness is increased fault tolerance via avoidance of 
defective cores and the implementation of memory redundancies [21]. 
The physical arrangement of one TrueNorth chip is a 64 by 64 array of cores (4096 total 
cores) covering an area of 4.3 cm2 including a total of 428 Mb of SRAM storing neuron 
data [21, 23]. A schematic of one core is shown in Fig. 3. The total amount of SRAM per core is 
approximately 107 kb [23]. The values for the neuron magnitudes and configuration weights are 
stored in the SRAM as digital outputs. 
The packaging of the TrueNorth chip includes 1.2 mm molding compound above the chip, 
as shown in Fig. 4. Below the molding compound, approximately 10 μm of metallization, 
dielectric, and via layers exist above the active region. Fig. 5 shows a sketch of the back end of 
line (not to scale). These interconnect layers are composed of various metals including aluminum 
and tungsten, possibly along with copper. 
 
 
 
Fig.  3.  Schematic of one of the 4096 cores in a TrueNorth chip. Courtesy of IBM [21]. 
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Operation 
The TrueNorth board operates on trained corelets. The particular corelet loaded in for these 
experiments was pre-trained where the training was conducted based on an IBM model file. The 
corelet classifies handwritten digits 0 through 9 from the modified NIST (MNIST) database. Of 
the 70,000 digits in the database, there are 60,000 digit images for the training data set and 10,000 
for classification. Of the 10,000 digits used for classification, there are approximately 1000 
samples of each digit [24]. 
The classification of a digit is signaled by the output neuron magnitudes. For an input 
image, the corelet evaluates 10 output neuron magnitude values ranging from 0 to 1 inclusive. An 
output neuron magnitude can be thought of as the likelihood of a particular digit being the correct 
classification of the image. Note, however, that the sum of all output neurons is not required to 
add up to 1 like independent probabilities. The output classification reported is the digit with the 
highest output neuron magnitude. 
 
Fig.  4. Illustration of the TrueNorth package (not to scale). Courtesy of UCLA. 
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Fig.  5. Schematic cross section of the IBM TrueNorth chip. The approximate height of the back end stack is about 
10μm. Courtesy of UCLA. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 
 
Vanderbilt’s Pelletron is an electrostatic particle accelerator primarily used to conduct 
radiation tests on electronic devices. The primary particles that can be accelerated are protons, 
alpha particles, oxygen ions, and chlorine ions, but it is possible to use other ions as well. The 
selected ion is accelerated using a positive electrostatic potential. Several nanometer-scale gold 
foils are used to scatter the beam, and magnets are used to steer the beam. The test chamber is 
cylindrical with an approximately two-foot diameter and height of 20 inches. The mount on which 
the electronics are placed is adjustable to provide different beam incident angles for the tested 
device. Additionally, there are electrical feed-throughs to allow for testing under bias and for real-
time data acquisition [25]. 
 
Chip Preparation 
The molding compound above the TrueNorth chip (Fig. 4) had to be removed to reduce the 
range necessary for the ions to reach the sensitive area. A picture of the exposed chip is shown in 
Fig. 6. 
 
Minimum Ion Energies 
As previously mentioned, above the active region of the TrueNorth chip is approximately 
10 μm of back end of line materials. As a result, the incident ion must have sufficient range to 
reach the sensitive volume to produce a SEE within the chip. Table 1 shows the minimum energy 
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required for the incident ion to penetrate a bit less than 10 μm of various metals as calculated by 
SRIM [26]. The maximum energy that can be achieved by the Pelletron varies based on the ion 
chosen. In the table above, if the energy required for a particular ion to penetrate around 10 μm of 
metal is greater than the maximum energy for that ion, the data point is represented as greater than 
the maximum Pelletron energy for that ion and grayed out. Using the SRIM energy data from 
Table 1, the possible ions to use for the SEE testing on the TrueNorth chip was narrowed down to 
either protons or alpha particles. If the metallization layers are composed of certain materials, there 
might not be enough energy in the oxygen ions or chlorine ions for SEE testing. It was also noted 
from the table that the minimum energy required to penetrate the metallization layers varies for 
Fig.  6.  Picture of the TrueNorth board after the chip (middle-left) was delidded. 
 
Table 1. Minimum energy required for various ions to penetrate 10μm of various metals. 
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different materials. Silicon dioxide has the lowest minimum energy, followed by silicon, then 
aluminum, copper, and finally tungsten.  
 
Maximum Ion Ranges 
In addition to looking at the minimum energy required for various ions to travel a certain 
distance through a material, SRIM is also able to calculate the range of ions in different materials. 
Table 2 is a range table of ions in various metals. To penetrate the metallization layers, the range 
must be at least 10 μm, therefore data points that do not achieve this specification are grayed out. 
Both protons and alpha particles have sufficient range for the various target materials considered. 
Oxygen ions are not guaranteed to have sufficient range to penetrate the metallization layers, 
particularly in areas that have high concentrations of copper or tungsten. Chlorine ions also do not 
have enough range for the energy at which they can be tested. Protons were selected since they 
were found to have sufficient energy and therefore range for SEE testing on TrueNorth.  
 
 
Table 2. Range of various ions at the Pelletron’s maximum energy of those ions in various target materials. 
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Testing Setup 
The radiation tests were conducted at Vanderbilt University using the Pelletron. The proton 
energy selected was 4 MeV, and at that energy, the possible proton fluxes range from 105 to 
1010 protons/cm2-s [25]. The TrueNorth board (Fig. 6) allowed for trained corelets to be uploaded 
via scripts from a computer. During irradiation, the board was mounted in the Pelletron’s vacuum 
chamber, and an Ethernet feed-through from the chamber was connected to the board. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 
Pre-Irradiation Accuracy 
The accuracy of pre-irradiation runs on the 10,000 digit MNIST test set using a pre-trained, 
fixed network (corelet) is 98.82%, which corresponds to 118 errors of the 10,000 digits classified. 
This is the baseline classification accuracy. Since TrueNorth operation is deterministic, all runs 
without radiation yield this exact accuracy. (Note these errors are not due to radiation, but rather 
the inherent nature of a finite, imperfect training set and occasionally ambiguous, sloppily 
handwritten digits.) A sample of some digits classified by the trained corelet are shown in Fig. 7. 
The green boxes in the figure represent examples of correct classifications. The red box is an 
example of an incorrect classification, which can also be called a critical error since this is a change 
in the output. The red box shows an example of a “9”; however, the trained corelet incorrectly 
classifies this digit as a “4” pre-irradiation. 
 
Post-Irradiation Accuracy 
In previous research on similar architectures emulated using FPGAs and software, parts 
were irradiated to a certain fluence, and the total number of errors were determined [5]. A similar 
experiment was run using the TrueNorth architecture. Multiple exposures were performed with 
fluences up to 5.6x107 cm-2 followed by determination of the overall classification accuracy. 
Between runs, the chip was reprogrammed and verified to consistently exhibit pre-irradiation 
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performance, including across classes. The results of the collection of runs from this experiment 
are shown in Fig. 8, where the number of classification errors is plotted as a function of fluence. 
The accuracy remains about the same after irradiation with only small variations with respect to 
the pre-irradiation, baseline number of errors. For the nine runs in Fig. 8, the mean number of 
errors is 116 errors, and the percent standard deviation is 5%. 
 
 
Fig.  7. Example of digits classified by the MNIST corelet running on the TrueNorth chip. Green indicates correct 
classification while red indicates an incorrect classification. Adapted from [29]. 
 
Fig. 8. Number of classification errors (out of 10,000) as a function of fluence after irradiation. 
 
 
21 
 
Mechanisms 
The errors resulting from irradiation are not permanent; they are soft errors. Reloading the 
model file returns TrueNorth to the original, pre-irradiation state. In addition, classification of a 
set of post-irradiation data results in the exact same classification every time. TrueNorth’s 
classification of the data is deterministic. As long as new errors are not introduced via irradiation, 
the resulting classification of all 10,000 digits remains the same each time. This is consistent with 
fault injection simulations on this architecture [8] and the expectation that the observed effects are 
the result of single event upsets in the SRAM. 
The classification changes resulting from radiation occur due to single events, not total 
ionizing dose. For one, reloading the model file returns TrueNorth to its original, pre-irradiation 
state and classification. Additionally, the dose accumulated over all the exposures to the TrueNorth 
chip was found to be less than 1 krad(SiO2). This provides further evidence that single event 
effects, not total ionizing dose, are causing the changes in classification. 
 
Critical Errors: Classifications Changed by Radiation 
Even though radiation did not significantly alter the total number of classification errors, 
some of the output classifications changed due to proton-induced soft errors, with the number of 
changes increasing with fluence. A pictorial example of how this can happen is shown in Fig. 9. 
The top row shows the handwritten digits 6, 7, 8, and 9 that are input into the trained corelet for 
classification. The bottom row shows the classification resulting from the corelet. The left side of 
the arrow shows the pre irradiation results, and the right side shows the results after irradiation to 
a proton fluence of 5.6x107 cm-2. Green boxes signify when the classification was correct, while 
red corresponds to an incorrect classification. In this simplistic example, the classification 
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accuracy both before and after irradiation is 75%. However, when comparing the outputs from the 
two classifications, there were actually two changes in classification. The “8” that was originally 
classified as a “5” was corrected, while the “7” (originally classified correctly) was incorrectly 
classified as a “3” after irradiation. So while the overall classification accuracy remained the same 
before and after irradiation (75%), there were actually two changes in classification resulting from 
radiation. Using this technique of comparing the results of the pre-irradiation to the post irradiation 
classification, Fig. 10 is generated using the same experimental runs used in Fig. 8. This figure 
shows the number of changes in classification compared to pre-irradiation as a function of fluence, 
where zero changes corresponds to the pre-irradiation classifications. As fluence increases 
(corresponding to an increased number of soft errors in the SRAM), the number of classification 
changes increases. However, as described before, there are approximately the same number of 
classification corrections (like “8” in Fig. 9) as incorrect classifications due to soft errors (like “7” 
in Fig. 9). In addition, there are some instances where an incorrect classification is not corrected, 
but the resulting output changes. An example of this is shown in Fig. 11. Low confidence 
classifications were most susceptible to classification changes after irradiation. 
 
 
 
Fig.  9. Example of how changes can occur due to radiation without affecting the overall classification accuracy.  The 
left side is the pre-irradiation classification of the digits 6, 7, 8, and 9, and the right side is the same digits after 
irradiation to a fluence of 5.6x107 cm-2. 
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Tolerable Errors: Output Neuron Magnitudes Changed by Radiation 
As previously mentioned, the output neuron magnitudes of the trained corelet determine 
the resulting classification of an image, and these values are stored in the SRAM. There are 
10,000 MNIST images being classified per run and each image has 10 output neuron magnitudes, 
so there are a total of 100,000 output neuron magnitudes per run. Because the output neuron 
magnitudes are not the final output, changes to these output neuron magnitudes are considered to 
be tolerable errors. 
Fig. 10. Number of changes in classification due to radiation with respect to original, pre-irradiation classification as 
a function of fluence. 
 
Fig. 11. Example of a digit classification changing due to irradiation, but still being incorrectly classified.  
Pre-irradiation (left), the 5 is incorrectly classified as a 9, and then after irradiation to a fluence of 5.6x107 cm-2, the 
same digit is incorrectly classified as a 3 (right). 
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After irradiation to a fluence of 2.6x107 cm-2, 29% of the output neuron magnitudes had 
changed due to SEUs in the SRAM. However, despite the large percentage of changes in output 
neuron magnitudes, there were still only 118 classification errors (98.82% accuracy), which is the 
same total number of errors pre-irradiation. Analysis showed 39 classification changes between 
the pre-irradiation and post-irradiation data, but for every classification error due to radiation, there 
was a correction. Of the 39 changes after radiation, 17 of the changes resulted in classification 
errors, 17 were classification corrections, and the remaining 5 were classifications that were 
incorrect both before and after irradiation. 
In order to cause a change in classification, the value of one output neuron magnitude must 
overcome the output neuron magnitude of the pre-irradiation classification. Fig. 12 shows the 
output neuron magnitude changes due to radiation that resulted in the 17 classification errors while 
Fig. 13 shows the 17 classification corrections. In both figures, the x-axis is the output neuron 
magnitude. The changes in output neuron magnitudes are represented by arrows. The start of the 
arrow corresponds to the value of the pre-irradiation output neuron magnitude, and the termination 
of the arrow corresponds to the post-irradiation value of the output neuron magnitude. The pairing 
of a red and black arrow represents the output neuron magnitudes for a single image. The red, 
dashed arrow represents the output neuron magnitudes for the incorrect classification. Conversely, 
the black, solid arrow corresponds to the output neuron magnitudes of the correct classification. 
Black digits are the values of the correct classification while red digits are the values of the 
incorrect classification. 
Since the value of the output neuron magnitude indicates the correlation between the output 
neuron magnitude’s digit and the input image, output neuron magnitudes on the right side of the 
graph indicate high confidence in the resulting classification, while those on the left suggest low 
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confidence. If high confidence is considered to be output neuron magnitudes with values greater 
than 0.95, then 93% of pre irradiation classifications on the 10,000 images set were found to be 
high confidence. In addition, of these high confidence classifications, 73% of them had an output 
neuron magnitude value of exactly 1. Figs. 12 and 13 show that the classification errors due to 
irradiation resulted from output neuron magnitudes which are not classified as high confidence. 
None of the classification changes resulted from high confidence output neuron magnitudes, and 
Fig. 12. Output neuron magnitudes for 17 classification errors resulting from radiation. Black arrows and digits 
correspond to the correct classification while red arrows and digits correspond to the incorrect classification. The 
beginning of the arrow is the output neuron magnitude pre-irradiation and the termination of the arrow is the 
post-irradiation output neuron magnitude. 
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only a few of the classification changes resulted from pre-irradiation output neuron magnitudes 
above 0.8. 
 
  
Fig. 13. Output neuron magnitudes for 17 classification corrections resulting from radiation. Black arrows and digits 
correspond to the correct classification while red arrows and digits correspond to the incorrect classification. The 
beginning of the arrow is the output neuron magnitude pre-irradiation and the termination of the arrow is the 
post-irradiation output neuron magnitude. 
 
27 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
SPECIFIC CLASSES 
 
 In addition to analyzing the overall errors and classification changes, the effect of soft 
errors in the SRAM on specific digits is analyzed. There are two ways of looking at every 
classification error that occurs. Fig. 14 shows a sample string of inputs to the corelet and the 
corresponding output classification. As seen in the figure, there is a single error, the “8” being 
incorrectly classified as a “5”. The “8” is an example of a false negative, where a false negative is 
not classifying the input correctly. On the other hand, the “5” is a false positive, which is an 
indication of an incorrect result. In other words, false negative corresponds to the input that is 
incorrectly classified, while false positive corresponds to the erroneous output. While a false 
negative is the incorrectly identified digit (the “8” in Fig. 14), a false positive is the classification 
of a digit that is not actually there (the “5” in Fig. 14). 
Here are false positives and false negatives in a more general context. A false positive is 
falsely alerting to something, or “crying wolf.” On the other hand, a false negative is not alerting 
to something that it should. This means that something slips by and is “invisible” to the 
classification system. Both of these situations could be undesirable. For example, say that 
classifying something as X causes alarm. On one hand, every false positive for X produces 
unnecessary alarm since X did not really occur. On the other hand, every false negative for X 
means that there is no alarm when there rightfully should be, because X did occur even though the 
classification system did not classify it as such. 
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Pre-Irradiation 
Analyzing the pre-irradiation data to look at the false positives and negatives of specific 
digits results in Fig. 15. In addition, the figure shows an example of an error and how the false 
positive and negative relates to the table. Looking at the yellow box, that there are 9 instances that 
an “8” is incorrectly classified. For reference, there are approximately 1000 examples of the digit 
“8”. On the other hand, there are 10 cases where the number input to the corelet is classified as a 
“0” when some other digit is actually input into the system. Since false negatives and false 
Fig. 14.  Demonstration of how one error (an “8” incorrectly classified as a “5”) can be separated into two components: 
a false negative (the “8”) and a false positive (the “5”.)  The top row is the input, and bottom row is the resulting 
output classification. 
 
Fig.  15.  The figure shows an example of an error and its corresponding false positive and false negative in the table.  
The table shows the number of false negatives and positives for each MNIST digit from 0 to 9. 
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positives each represent a different way of looking at one error, the sum of the false negative 
column is equal to the sum of the false positive column. These two sums are both 118, which is to 
be expected since that is the total number of errors in the system pre-irradiation. 
It can also be seen from the table in Fig. 15 that there is a bias toward certain numbers. Of 
the ten digits, “0” has the lowest false negative classification rate. Of the approximately 
1000 examples of “0” input into the system, only 2 were classified as something else. On the other 
hand, “4” has the highest instance of classification errors as shown by 29 false negatives. As far 
as false positives (the incorrect output classifications) go, “4” has only 5 instances, meaning that 
there are only 5 times that some input is incorrectly classified as a “4”. In this case, there is a bias 
against classifying “4”s, since “4” has a high number of missed classifications (false negatives) 
and a low number of incorrect classifications (false positives). There is a bias towards classifying 
numbers as “0”, indicated by the low number of false negatives and moderate number of false 
positives. These observations may depend on the training data set. 
 
Post-Irradiation 
The effect of radiation on the number of classification errors for specific digits is analyzed 
next. Figs. 16 and 17 show how the number of false positives changes with fluence for “0” and 
“6” respectively. As the fluence increases for the digit “0”, the number of false positives decreases. 
On the other hand, the number of false positives for “6” increases with fluence. 
Taking all the false positive and false negative data from figures like Figs. 16 and 17 and 
combining them into one histogram results in Fig. 18. Fig. 18 has the false positives at the top half 
of the y-axis and the false negatives going down the lower half of the axis. The pre-irradiation data 
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sets are the yellow bars, while the blue bars are the post-irradiation data. The positive x direction 
corresponds to increasing fluence within each digit’s data set. 
This figure allows comparison between digits and also analysis of trends within a specific 
digit. The digit with the highest occurrence of false positives is “9”, meaning that there are more 
incorrect outputs that are “9”s than any other digit. The highest number of false negatives belongs 
to the digit “4”, meaning that the “4”s input into the system are the most often incorrectly classified 
digit. The number of false positives for “0” and “5” decreases with fluence, while it increases for  
Fig. 16.  As fluence increases, the number of false positives for the digit “0” decreases. 
 
Fig. 17.  As fluence increases, the number of false positives for the digit “6” increases. 
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“2”, “4”, and “6”. On the other hand, the number of false negatives increases with fluence for the 
digits “2” and “8”. 
  
Fig. 18. Plot of false positives and false negatives for all digits versus increasing fluence. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
SIMULATIONS 
 
Neural Network Set Up 
 In this work, simulations were conducted on neural networks classifying the digits in the 
MNIST database. Keras [28], written in Python, is a high-level neural networks API which was 
used to create the simulations. Keras was used in conjunction with Tensorflow [29], an 
open-source framework for developing machine learning applications. Using Keras and 
Tensorflow, a script was written in Python that trained a neural network using a perceptron model 
and the MNIST training database and then evaluated the network on the MNIST classification set.  
The neural network created was a multi-layer network consisting of an input layer, hidden 
layers, and an output layer. The first layer took as inputs and processed the 784 pixels in the 28x28 
pixel MNIST image. This input layer contained no parameters (analogous to weights) and had 784 
outputs, which were used as inputs to the hidden layers. The hidden layers used 12560 parameters 
to reduce the 784 inputs to just 16 outputs. These 16 outputs were then used as inputs to the output 
layer of the network. This final layer output 10 values which correspond to the confidence level 
for each digit 0 through 9. These 10 outputs are analogous to the output neuron magnitudes 
resulting from TrueNorth. The highest value of the 10 outputs corresponds to a digit, and that digit 
is the final classification. Just like in the TrueNorth architecture, the accuracy of the trained 
perceptron-based neural network was calculated, and the accuracy of the simulated neural network 
was 93.2% before fault injection. 
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Fault Injection 
  In order to simulate the effects of radiation on the neural network, the parameter values 
(weights) within the layers were changed after training. There were a total of 12730 parameters, 
the majority of which were contained in the hidden layers. To simulate a random upset in a neural 
network, a weight would be selected at random and then its value changed to a random new one 
within the range of possible weights. After upsetting a percentage of the total parameter values, 
the neural network was run on the classification set of MNIST digits. 
After evaluation, the total accuracy of the classification was calculated. In addition, the 
number of changes in output compared to the “pre-irradiation” classifications was found. Then 
additional parameters were changed, the network evaluated, and the accuracy and number of 
changes calculated. This was repeated until 20% of the parameters had been changed. The plots in 
Figs. 19 and 20 were produced by seeing how the percent of total parameters upset affected 
accuracy and number of classification changes respectively. 
Overall, Fig. 19 shows the gradual degradation of the classification accuracy as the number 
of injected errors increases. Sudden drops in classification accuracy can be attributed to injected 
errors that propagated to effect several outputs. Sections where the classification accuracy stayed 
approximately constant indicate that injected errors caused little change in the outputs. Finally, 
instances where the classification accuracy increased as the number of injected errors increased 
show that the simulated upsets caused classification corrections. Injecting errors into 
approximately 1% of the weights had very little effect on the classification accuracy. There is a 
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slow degradation in accuracy until about 3% of the weights are upset, after which a jump in  
accuracy degradation is seen. It is also seen here that the accuracy of the neural network degrades  
to 50% accuracy after approximately 11% of the total weights are upset. In addition, when 20% of 
the total weights are upset, the accuracy of the system has dropped to only 25% accurate. 
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Fig.  19. Classification accuracy degradation as percentage of upset weight values. 
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Fig.  20. Relative number of changes in classification as percentage of weight values upset. 
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Fig. 20 shows the relative number of changes in classification resulting from the injected 
errors with respect to the original classification of the network. This is similar to comparing the 
post-irradiation classifications to the pre-irradiation classifications. The number of relative 
changes is zero (origin) when no weights have been modified since the neural networks are still 
exactly the same. It takes changing about 10% of the parameter values for half of the 
10,000 MNIST images classifications to change. Additionally, after injecting errors into about 
20% of the weights, almost every single classification had been modified.  
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The results of this experiment can be applied more generally to neuromorphic architectures. 
In the data presented here, the overall classification accuracy remained constant after introducing 
errors in the SRAM by proton irradiation; however, changes occurred within the specific digits. In 
neuromorphic computing architectures, it may be necessary to look not only at the overall accuracy 
but also the accuracy of specific classes. Even if the accuracy is not affected by single events, if a 
classification system gets better at classifying benign objects, but worse at recognizing critical 
objects, then arguably the classification system has worsened due to single events. Critical 
applications of neuromorphic systems may require a more in-depth analysis of the occurrence of 
individual errors. 
Both the overall classification accuracy and individual digit classification accuracy were 
analyzed in this work. The classification accuracy before irradiation was 98.82%. Introducing soft 
errors by proton irradiation up to fluences of 5.6x107 cm-2 did not significantly affect this accuracy. 
Although the accuracy stayed approximately constant, tolerable errors did cause an increasing 
number of changes between pre-irradiation and post-irradiation classifications. In addition, when 
analyzing individual digits, these tolerable errors caused changes to the classification accuracy of 
particular digits. Some digits had a decrease in errors as fluence increased, while others had an 
increase in errors with fluence. As a result, analyzing the effect of tolerable errors on classification 
accuracy and individual digit classification accuracy may be a useful metric in evaluating 
neuromorphic architectures. 
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